

# Deal or No Deal: Commercial & Operational Due Diligence on a Rs.2,800 Crore Generic Pharma Acquisition

M&A Due Diligence + 100-Day Plan | Industry: Pharma | Client: Mid-Market PE Fund (hypothetical) | Timeline: 8 weeks | Date: April 2026

*Cut the EBITDA forecast by 22% after a channel-dilution and USFDA-warning-letter analysis, renegotiated the valuation down Rs.310 crore, and built a 100-day integration plan that protected the acquisition thesis.*

Frameworks: Adjusted EBITDA Normalisation . Bottom-Up Revenue Bridge . Scenario & Sensitivity Analysis . 100-Day Integration Plan

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## Challenge

A mid-market PE fund had a letter of intent on a Rs.2,800 crore Indian generic pharma company - a strong domestic chronic-care portfolio with a small US generics export business. The seller's EBITDA projection implied a 9.1x entry multiple, justified by a claimed 18% revenue CAGR from the US pipeline and domestic chronic growth.

The fund's investment committee had been burned twice before by India-pharma deals where "the pipeline was the story." Their question to us: **"What is the true maintainable EBITDA - and what breaks between signing and day 100?"**

## Approach

We ran a three-track diligence over eight weeks:

**Track 1 - Commercial diligence.** Bottom-up revenue bridge for the domestic portfolio: molecule-level growth rates, price erosion (NLEM/DPCO impact), prescription analytics (IQVIA/EPRX-style data), and doctor-level share-of-voice analysis for the top 60 molecules (which comprised 68% of domestic revenue). For the US business: ANDA pipeline status, first-to-file opportunities, and channel concentration (wholesaler + GPO customer mapping).

**\*\*Track 2 - Operational & regulatory diligence.\*\*** Plant-level capacity and utilisation, cost-of-goods benchmarking, and a deep dive on regulatory history - including a USFDA warning letter at the flagship plant and two import alerts in the last 36 months.

**\*\*Track 3 - Financial & tax diligence.\*\*** Normalisation of one-offs, related-party transactions, channel inventory (secondary sales vs. primary), and contingent liabilities (litigation, export penalties).

**\*\*Track 4 - 100-day plan build.\*\*** We ran integration-scenario workshops with the target's CFO and plant heads to pressure-test synergy assumptions and identify day-1 risks.

## **| Analysis**

**\*\*The domestic story was real - but softer than presented.\*\*** Chronic therapy growth of 14% was genuine (diabetes, cardiac, respiratory), but the seller's forecast assumed zero NLEM price erosion on 40% of the portfolio; our base case applied 3.2% annual erosion on those molecules, cutting domestic EBITDA by Rs.38 crore by year 3.

**\*\*The US business was the valuation fulcrum.\*\*** The seller's deck priced the US pipeline at Rs.540 crore of forecast revenue by year 4. Our molecule-by-molecule screen found:

- 7 of 22 ANDAs were for molecules with 4+ competitors already - commodity pricing;
- the flagship plant's warning letter meant no US product launches from that site until remediation - a 14-20 month delay;
- one "anchor" product - 38% of the US forecast - faced a first-filer challenge with an 8-month exclusivity window that the seller's model had overstated to 18 months.

Net effect: **\*\*US revenue forecast cut 41%, and total EBITDA forecast cut 22%\*\*** (year-3: Rs.412 crore vs. seller's Rs.528 crore).

**\*\*Working capital had a landmine:\*\*** channel inventory at the distributor level was 11.2 weeks vs. 7-week industry norm - suggesting the seller had been "stuffing" the channel to hit the trailing EBITDA number. Adjusting for the pull-back, trailing EBITDA was ~9% lower than presented.

## **| Findings**

1. True maintainable EBITDA was Rs.238 crore vs. the presented Rs.262 crore - an 9% adjustment before any growth debate.
2. The US pipeline was an option, not an asset - worth 30-40% of the seller's ascribed value, with a remediation-linked trigger.

3. The 100-day risk register surfaced three deal-breakers-in-waiting: key-man dependence (two R&D heads held the ANDA knowledge), a Rs.62 crore related-party receivable that needed haircutting, and plant-level culture clash flagged by 60% of target middle managers in confidential interviews.
4. The deal still worked at a revised price - at  $\leq 8.2x$  adjusted EBITDA, the domestic chronic franchise alone supported the return thesis.

## **Recommendation**

We recommended the fund **renegotiate on the adjusted numbers, with structure**:

- Price at  $\leq 8.2x$  adjusted EBITDA (Rs.1,950-2,050 crore) - a Rs.310 crore reduction from the LOI;
- A remediation escrow tied to the USFDA warning-letter closure (Rs.90 crore released on plant re-inspection);
- Vendor financing on the related-party receivable with 24-month repayment;
- A 100-day plan sequenced as: day 0-30 cash control & channel-inventory normalisation; day 30-60 KPI reset and R&D retention letters; day 60-100 plant remediation governance and synergy execution (procurement + back-office consolidation worth Rs.24 crore annually).

## **Outcome**

The fund went back to the seller with the adjusted case; after two rounds, they signed at  $8.0x$  adjusted EBITDA - **Rs.310 crore below the original LOI** - with the remediation escrow in place. Twelve months post-close, the domestic chronic franchise grew 13% as modelled, channel inventory normalised to 7.8 weeks, and the remediation plan was on track for re-inspection. The deal, which would have destroyed value at the LOI price, is on track for a  $2.4x$  MOIC in the fund's base case.

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\*Case study reconstructed for illustration from typical engagement patterns. Client and figures are hypothetical.\*

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Prepared by Kunwar Analytics - [kunwaranalytics.in](http://kunwaranalytics.in)